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LOUISIANA L A W REVIEW
PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
EXTENSIONS OF FULMER V. FULMER
As discussed earlier in a symposium article,' the significance of the
decision in Fulmer v. Fulmer,2 which held that a determination of marital
fault in a separation proceeding barred relitigation of fault for the purpose
of alimony after divorce, was its attempt to go beyond the facts in the case
and establish authoritative rules governing the application of Civil Code
article 160. 3 Within the last term, four cases have considered the effect of
Fulmer and have extended its application by applying the rules which
appeared in dicta.
In Trahan v. Trahan4 and Moon v. Moon5 the courts of appeal
considered whether the parties by mutual consent could alter the effect of
Fulmer. The spouses in Trahan by consent judgment in a divorce pro-
ceeding, preceded by a judgment of separation from bed and board, agreed
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-
Persons, 35 LA. L. REv. 259, 263 (1975).
2. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974). The constitutionality of the decision in Fulmer
was sustained in Perez v. Perez, 334 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 160:
When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not sufficient means for her
support, the court may allow her, out of the property and earnings of the
husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income when: (I) the
wife obtains a divorce; (2) the husband obtains a divorce on the ground that he
and his wife have been living separate and apart, or on the ground that there
has been no reconciliation between the spouses after a judgment of separation
from bed and board, for a specified period of time; or (3) the husband obtained
a valid divorce from his wife in a court of another state or country which had
no jurisdiction over her person.
This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if
the wife remarries.
4. 340 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
5. 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs refused, 347 So. 2d 250 (La. 1977).
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to pretermit the question of fault. The facts of Moon differed some-
what in that the spouses by stipulation contained in the judgment of
separation provided that the determination of the husband's fault in the
judgment of separation would not be determinative of the wife's lack of
pre-separation "freedom from fault" for purposes of determining her
eligibility for alimony after divorce. In each case6 the court held that the
language of Fulmer was explicit; relitigation of fault for purposes of post-
divorce alimony is barred. The litigants "cannot require the courts to
relitigate a matter that has been previously adjudicated.'" To allow the
litigants to do so would subvert the stated policy of judical economy and
consistency afforded by the decision in Fulmer.8
The ground for divorce in Fulmer was non-reconciliation for the
required statutory period following a judgment of separation.' There is no
question but that the ground for separation is relevant, since the separation
judgment forms a part of the ground for divorce. But in dictum the Fulmer
court stated: "As to the pre-separation fault, it [judgment of separation
from bed and board] should constitute a conclusive determination which
equally bars relitigation of the issue of fault, when alimony is sought under
6. Trahan was cited by the court in Moon. 345 So. 2d at 171.
7. Trahan v. Trahan, 340 So. 2d at 677.
8. "We assume that the legislative choice [interpreted legislative intent of
article 160] is based on the judicial economy and consistency represented by having
the separation-causing fault determined once and in the separation proceeding
itself, rather than litigating (or relitigating) it in the much later divorce proceed-
ings-where with different testimony or less recent recollection, the separation-
causing fault might even be determined contrary to that determined at an earlier
well-tried and hotly-contested separation adjudication." Fulmer v. Fulmer, 301 So.
2d at 625.
9. When there has been no reconciliation between the spouses for a period of
one year or more from the date the judgment of separation from bed and board
was signed, either spouse may obtain a judgment of divorce.
If an appeal is taken, a suit for divorce may not be commenced until the
day after the date upon which the judgment becomes definitive as provided by
Article 1842 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure or until the expiration of
the time stated in the preceding paragraph, whichever is later.
When a judgment of divorce is obtained by the husband against whom the
judgment of separation from bed and board was rendered, the wife has the
same right to recover alimony as if she had obtained the divorce.
The provisions of this Section do not affect in any way the right of the
spouse who obtained the judgment of separation from bed and board to retain
the custody and care of the children, as provided by law.
LA. R.S. 9:302 (Supp. 1970), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, Nos. 448, 702. The
statute as it was applied in Fulmer differed slightly, but the differences are not
relevant to the cases under discussion.
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Article 160, whether the divorce is based either on La. R.S. 9:301 or on
9:302. "0
Presumably, a determination of whose fault primarily caused the
initial separation would also be relevant when the ground for divorce is
continuously living separate and apart for two years. For if there were no
separation judgment rendered prior to the divorce under 9:30111 and the
wife claimed alimony under article 160, the issue of the wife's lack of
fault would center upon the facts surrounding the initial separation of the
spouses, which initiated the time period under 9:301. Furthermore, even if
the ground for divorce were 9:301, the rule that as to pre-separation fault
the judgment of separation from bed and board would be conclusive under
article 160 would serve the same policy as is served when the ground for
divorce is 9:302-i.e., judicial economy and consistency. Not only would
the same policies be served, but also application of the Fulmer rule when
the ground for divorce is 9:301 would prevent a subversion of the policy
considerations by a spouse against whom a judgment of separation had
been rendered. By waiting an additional year or less to seek a divorce on
the ground of 9:302, the spouse determined to be at fault in the separation
proceedings could relitigate the question of whose fault caused the initial
separation.
In Hatch v. Hatch' 2 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's judgment sustaining the husband's exceptions of lis pendens
and res adjudicata to the wife's reconventional demand for alimony.
Plaintiff-husband, seeking a divorce under 9:301, had previously obtained
a judgment of separation from bed and board from his wife on the ground
of abandonment.' 3 The wife by reconventional demand, in answer to the
husband's petition for divorce, sought alimony and the opportunity to
relitigate the question of fault. Relying on Fulmer the court held that the
wife was not entitled to relitigate the issue of pre-separation fault for the
purpose of alimony after divorce when a divorce was sought by the
husband under 9:301.14
10. 301 So. 2d at 629 (emphasis added).
11. "When the spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for a
period of two years or more, either spouse may sue for and obtain a judgment of
absolute divorce." LA. R.S. 9:301 (1960).
12. 341 So. 20 1270 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writs refused, 343 So. 2d 1080 (La.
1977).
13. Hatch v. Hatch, 335 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writs refused, 338 So. 2d
113 (La. 1976).
14. "This judgment of separation was a judicial determination of the marital
[Vol. 38
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A further extension of the dicta in Fulmer was considered in Moon-
the issue of post-separation fault. In Moon the wife had obtained a
judgment of separation on the ground of the husband's cruelty and then,
subsequently, sought a divorce on the ground of non-reconciliation for the
prescribed period after the separation judgment. 5 By reconventional de-
mand the husband sought a divorce on the ground of adultery. 16 Thus, the
issue squarely presented in Moon was whether the husband may introduce
evidence of the wife's post-separation fault when she claims alimony after
divorce. The court answered the inquiry in the affirmative, relying on
specific language in Fulmer limiting its effect to pre-separation fault.' 7
Although the dicta in Fulmer precluded its application when a divorce was
sought for post-separation fault, the court in Moon concluded that its
holding was consistent with the underlying policy considerations: (1) to
encourage reconciliation during the post-separation waiting period'8 and
fault which caused the separation. It constituted a conclusive determination of pre-
separation fault when the wife seeks alimony under Civil Code Article 160. This rule
applies whether the action of divorce is based on R.S. 9:301 or 9:302. Fulmer v.
Fulmer, 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1976) (sic); Nethken v. Nethken, 307 So. 2d,563 (La.
1975)." 341 So. 2d at 1271.
15. LA. R.S. 9:302 (Supp. 1970) (prior to 1977 amendments).
16. Relying on Jones v. Floyd, 154 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1953), the court
recognized, and the husband conceded, that "after a suit for divorce under LSA-
R.S. 9:302 has been filed by one'spouse, a reconventional demand by the other
spouse for a divorce on other grounds, including adultery, states no cause of
action." 345 So. 2d at 173.
17. "Thus, where a judicial separation is decreed as caused by the fault of one
spouse or the other, such fault as judicially determined to be the cause of the
separation is normally determinative of the issue of whether the husband or the wife
is or is not at fault, for purposes of deciding whether the wife is entitled to alimony
under Article 160. Such a conclusion is, of course, not applicable if the divorce is
sought for post-separation fault such as adultery; for the sole effect of the separa-
tion judgment is a conclusive adjudication as to which spouse's pre-separation fault
primarily caused the separation." Fulmer v. Fulmer, 301 So. 2d at 629 (emphasis
added). In Webster v. Webster, 308 So. 2d 302, 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), cited by
the court in Moon, 345 So. 2d at 172, the court concluded: "We interpret the
foregoing [Fulmer] to mean that once a wife's freedom from fault has been deter-
mined in a separation proceeding, the only issue concerning fault of the wife in a
subsequent divorce proceeding is whether the wife has been guilty of fault subse-
quent to the decree of separation."
18. "Considering the Louisiana separation and divorce laws as a whole, we
believe our holding is consistent with the intent of the legislature. The post-
separation waiting period of LSA-R.S. 9:302 is designed principally to give the
spouses a chance to reconcile their differences and resume their marriage. If serious
post-separation fault were not a defense to the wife's claim for alimony after
divorce, the intent of the legislature in providing the waiting period of LSA-R.S.
19781
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(2) to avoid the economic necessity of the husband's filing suit for divorce
on the ground of the wife's post-separation fault.19
CHANGE OF CUSTODY--"CONSIDERED DECREE"
When a spouse seeks a change in legal custody of his child, generally
the jurisprudence has required the spouse to prove (1) that the present
environment of the child is deleterious and (2) that the petitioning spouse
could provide a better environment.2° The "double burden" of proof is
applicable when there has been a considered decree of custody by the trial
court and thereafter the other parent seeks a change in custody. As defined
by the jurisprudence, a "considered decree" means "a trial of the issue
9:302 would be subverted. Adultery is a serious form of fault, and its occurrence
after the judgment of separation would probably lessen the chances of a reconcilia-
tion." 345 So. 2d at 173.
19. "We do not think the law should force the husband to seek a divorce on the
grounds of serious post-separation fault in order to avoid payment of alimony after
divorce. Such a holding could encourage divorce and discourage reconciliation.
With the possiblilty of alimony payments looming ahead, even a husband who
desires a reconciliation and resumption of the marriage could be moved by econom-
ic considerations to seek a divorce on account of the wife's post-separation fault."
Id.
20. In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 348 So. 2d 1315, 1316 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977),
according to the majority opinion by Judge Watson, "the double burden rule has
been abandoned in favor of the approach that the courts must seek, above all else,
the welfare of the child." Authority cited for the proposition that the "double
burden rule" had been abandoned in favor of a more flexible rule in change of
custody matters was Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971). As
clarified by the dissent, Fulco could be interpreted as modifying the "double
burden rule" of Decker v. Landry, 227 La. 603, 80 So. 2d 91 (1955), as it makes
reference not to "double burden" but "heavy burden" of proof in change of
custody suits. The author of the dissenting opinion reviews the jurisprudence and
concludes: "The Monsour case [Monsour v. Monsour, 347 So. 2d 203 (La. 1977)],
the most recent pronouncement on the subject, fails to clarify that burden ["heavy
burden" of Fulco], which is a pressing need of our courts. That clarification can
only issue from our Supreme Court and I urge the court to clear up the confusion
now in existence." Bushnell v. Bushnell, 348 So. 2d at 1321 (Domengeaux, J.,
dissenting).
The Bushnell decision was cited disapprovingly in Languirand v. Languirand,
350 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977). After reviewing all of the jurisprudence, the
Languirand court concluded that Fulco did not discard the "double burden" of
proof in change of custody cases. In summarizing the policy reasons for imposing
such a difficult burden of proof, the court stated: "This latter factor [length of time
the stable and secure environment has been maintained] is the reason for the
existence of the rule imposing the burden of proof on the parent seeking the change
and that is to avoid whimsically unsettling a child's stable and secure environment.
In that sense, we are considering of paramount importance, the best interest and
welfare of the child." Id. at 976.
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and decision thereon applying pertinent principles of law to the facts
adduced."21
In Stevens v. Stevens,22 the question whether a default judgment may
constitute "a considered decree" was presented. The First Circuit Court
of Appeal concluded that a default judgment may be a "considered
decree" depending upon the evidence taken at the proceedings. 23 If
evidence is adduced concerning a spouse's fitness to have the care,
custody and control of the children, it is a considered decree; but there is
no presumption that a judgment (default or otherwise) is a considered
decree.
Because, as a matter of practice, custody awards are often rendered
incidental to the rendition of the judgment of separation or divorce,
with no evidence being offered on the issue of custody, we will not
presume, in the absence of any evidence in the record on appeal, that
such an award of custody was a considered decree. Thus the party
alleging the applicability of the double burden rule must show,
through introduction of the transcript of the default proceedings or
otherwise, that the custody was "considered" in the prior pro-
ceeding. 24
By virtue of its decision that there is no presumption that a judgment is a
considered decree (even if it is contested), the court has placed the
evidentiary burden on the spouse with legal custody. Practically speaking,
the burden may not be so onerous if what is required is simply introduction
of the transcript of the proceedings. Whether this decision, placing the
evidentiary burden on the spouse with legal custody, is consistent with the
policy underlying the "double burden" rule is questionable. 25 Yet, be-
cause of the legal significance attached to a "considered decree" and the
difficulty in bearing the "double burden" of proof, the decision in Ste-
21. Partin v. Partin, 339 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ refused, 341
So. 2d 419 (La. 1977); Gulino v. Gulino, 303 So. 2d 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
22. 340 So. 2d 584 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976), cited in Languirand v. Languirand,
350 So. 2d 973, 974 n.l (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
23. 340 So. 2d at 587. See Swann v. Young, 311 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1975); Southern v. Southern, 308 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
24. 340 So. 2d at 587 (Emphasis added).
25. In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 348 So. 2d at 1321, Judge Domengeaux in his
dissenting opinion stated: "Not only is the party seeking change required to prove
the child is in an environment detrimental to him, the party must also prove the
environment he can provide is better. This effectively prevents children from being
bounced back and forth from parent to parent, like so many tennis balls, when the
1978]
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vens may be justified in light of the prevailing consideration in matters of
custody-the best interests of the children.26
INTERSPOUSAL BAR TO SunT
Under title 9, section 291 of the Revised Statutes, 27 a wife is pro-
hibited from suing her husband28 unless judicially separated except for: (a)
a separation from bed and board; (b) a divorce; (c) a separation of
property; (d) restitution of her paraphernal property. Two significant cases
this term considered the questions whether this statute barred (a) a suit by
the wife against her husband to make executory past due alimony pendente
lite prior to a judgment of separation29 and (b) a habeas corpus action
during the existence of the marriage by the wife against her husband,
seeking custody of her minor children. 30 In both cases, the respective
courts ultimately answered the questions in the negative.
In Hartley v. Hartley31 the First Circuit Court of Appeal reasoned
that there is specific authority under section 291 to sue for a separation
from bed and board and "an award of alimony is an incident to such a suit,
.. therefore, we now hold that the same would be true for a suit to make
past due alimony executory." 32 To rule otherwise, the court correctly
parents are equally equipped to care for the children." For a discussion of the
prevailing policy of the "double burden" in Languirand v. Languirand, see note
20, supra.
26. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 157, as amended by 1977 La. Acts., No. 448. Prior
to the 1977 amendment article 157 provided that custody should be granted to the
party obtaining the separation or divorce, with judicial discretion to derogate from
this rule for the "greater advantage" of the children. Act 448 of 1977 eliminated the
former presumption; the children's "best interest" is now the only factor to be
considered.
27. As long as the marriage continues and the spouses are not separated
judicially a married woman may not sue her husband except for:
(1) A separation of property;
(2) The restitution and enjoyment of her paraphernal property;
(3) A separation from bed and board; or
(4) A divorce.
LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1960).
28. The same prohibition applies to the husband by jurisprudential interpreta-
tion. See, e.g., Dumas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 241 La. 1096, 134 So.
2d 45 (1961); Harvey v. Engler, 184 La. 858, 168 So. 81 (1936).
29. Hartley v. Hartley, 341 So. 2d 1257 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writs granted, 343
So. 2d 204 (La. 1977).
30. Stelly v. Montgomery, 339 So. 2d 956 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 347
So. 2d 1145 (La. 1977).
31. 341 So. 2d 1257 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writs granted, 343 So. 2d 204 (La. 1977).
32. Id. at 1260.
[Vol. 38
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noted, 33 would have the effect of making the alimony award unenforce-
able until after the judgment of separation from bed and board.
A much more difficult question involving an interpretation of section
291 was raised in Stelly v. Montgomery34: may a wife during the marriage
institute habeas corpus proceedings against her husband to regain custody
of the children? The Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit responded in the
negative on the basis that section 291, by its statutory language, would
prohibit such a suit. 35 Furthermore, an earlier supreme court decision
permitting such a suit, State ex rel. Lasserre v. Michel,36 could be
distinguished on the following grounds: (a) at the time Lasserre was
decided, applications for writs of habeas corpus were made in the name of
the state,37 whereas the Code of Civil Procedure now provides that the writ
"may be ordered by the court only on petition" 38 and (b) when the
legislature adopted section 291 in 1960 it decided not to follow the
rationale of Lasserre .39 The dissenting opinion took issue with the majori-
ty as to the validity of Lasserre, "a decision of the highest court of our
33. "Otherwise, an award of alimony would have no meaning, and could not be
enforced until after a judgment of separation." Id.
34. 339 So. 2d 956 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 347 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1977).
35. In Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La. 1975), the court stated that
section 9:291 limits to four the causes of action that a married woman can bring
against her husband during the marriage, and the four so enumerated are exclusive,
not illustrative.
36. 105 La. 741, 30 So. 122 (1901). The supreme court held that even though no
suit for separation or divorce has been filed the statutory interspousal immunity
from suit does not bar the courts from hearing a habeas corpus proceeding in-
stituted by one parent against the other, the reason being such a suit is "actually
instituted in the interest of the children, although done so by a parent, to effectuate
the state's interest in the welfare of these children." Stelly v. Montgomery, 347 So.
2d 1145, 1147 (La. 1977).
37. "When the writ issues, the wife is called into court in the name of and by
the state itself, though this be done on the relation of a husband. It is true that the
ultimate action of the court upon the writ may be an aid and in enforcement of
private rights,--of the rights of the husband or of the wife in the premises,-but the
result is incidental and consequential." State ex rel. Lasserre v. Michel, 105 La.
741, 747, 30 So. 122, 125 (1901).
38. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3781: "A writ of habeas corpus, mandamus, or quo
warranto may be ordered by the court only on petition. The proceedings may be
tried summarily and the writ when ordered may be signed by the clerk under the
seal of the court, or it may be issued and signed by the judge without further
formality."
39. "Perhaps the legislature reasoned that permitting interspousal suits for
custody during marriage, where there is no pending suit for separation or divorce,
could cause many problems as to child support, administration of the child's estate,
19781
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state . ... 4 Convincingly, the author of the dissenting opinion
observed that "at the time of the Lasserre decision it was well established
that a suit, such as this, need not be instituted in the name of the state." 4'
Since there was thus no real substantive difference between section 291
and its source and Code of Civil Procedure article 3781 and its source,
Lasserre should be considered controlling. Furthermore, by a rather
lengthy quotation from Lasserre, the dissent established that the same
policy considerations exist which dictated the result in Lasserre.
On appeal the supreme court, in reversing the ruling of the Third
Circuit, quoted at length from the dissenting opinion. Although the su-
preme court had in non-habeas situations interpreted the four exceptions
provided in section 291 as exclusive, not illustrative,42 the supreme court
in Stelly stated: "We did not intend to overrule or affect the long-settled
interpretation, State ex rel. Lasserre v. Michel, 105 La. 741, 30 So. 122
(1901), of the statute's inapplicability to habeas suits under the present
factual situation." '4 3 In the dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Sanders
challenged the majority opinion's position that there is no real difference
between the provisions of Code of Practice article 791 and Code of Civil
Procedure article 3781:
The change made is not that refuted in the majority opinion, that the
suit no longer need be brought in the name of the state. No such
requirement has been in our law for many years. Rather, the change
made is that the writ of habeas corpus does not issue in the name of
the State . . . . Thus, any basis for suggesting that a habeas corpus
suit is a state inquiry has been eliminated."
Summarizing the contervailing policy considerations in favor of a strict
construction of section 291, Chief Justice Sanders concludes that the
purpose of the statute is to promote "family stability," reflecting the
state's "strong public policy against suits between husband and wife. '4
There is no question that section 291, as effectively argued by the
liability for the child's torts, etc. Apparently the legislature decided that all of these
matters should be handled as incidental to separation or divorce proceedings."
Stelly v. Montgomery, 339 So. 2d 956, 959 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 959 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 960 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La. 1975).
43. 347 So. 2d at 1148. The rest of the opinion was dedicated to a consideration
of the custody issue on its merits.
44. Id. at 1150-51 (Sanders, C. J., dissenting).
45. "If they are living together, the policy prevents disruption of domestic
[Vol. 38
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Chief Justice, does reflect a strong public policy against suits between
husband and wife. Yet, when examining all of the stated policy considera-
tions, the result reached by the majority seems the most desirable. In fact,
as observed by the dissent, the validity of the Lasserre decision in light of
procedural changes is questionable as a matter of statutory interpretation.
The statute is explicit; and properly, "any expansion of the allowable suits
addresses itself to the legislative branch." 4 6 In default of legislative
action, however, a majority of the supreme court obviously felt compelled
for policy reasons to construe the statute liberally, a departure from some
of its earlier decisions, and rely upon a precedent of dubious viability.
tranquility. If they are separated, though not judicially, the policy encourages
reconciliation." Id. at 1160 (Sanders, C. J., dissenting).
46. Id.
